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ON THE DANGER OF ALLOWING MARITAL FAULT
TO RE-EMERGE IN THE GUISE OF TORTS
Harry D. Krause*
Mary Ann Glendon is of the vanishing species of social thinkers
who combine meticulous scholarship, integrity, brilliance, imagina-
tion, and compassion with a considered-and strong-point of view.
Glendon has deeply influenced modern thinking on family law world-
wide. Her work towers above that of her contemporaries in a debate
that has become increasingly politicized and polarized. She has
thoughtfully reviewed what is happening and considered what should
be happening to marriage and to the family.
The three decades that we have known each other and met and
worked together at a great variety of places and occasions all over the
world-ranging from the meetings of the Board of Directors and the
Board of Editors of the American Journal of Comparative Law, the
Panel of Advisers to the American Law Institute's ongoing family law
project, and on numerous international congresses of the greatest ge-
ographic and subject matter variety-have meant a great deal to me
personally and professionally. Mary Ann is a good friend as well as
ideal role model. Her work represents a level of achievement to
which one can only aspire-but which remains out of reach.
She has worked in the finest traditions of comparative law to carry
forward the work of her teacher, Max Rheinstein, searching out re-
sponses to similar social forces in comparable societies-especially
those of Western Europe-and seeking to draw out answers that may
help in solving our problems. Contributing to the ongoing Transfor-
mation of Family Law,' she has inquired into the social meaning of to-
day's marriage and unmarried cohabitation, of Abortion and Divorce in
Western Law,2 the relative roles of State, Law, and Family,3 and has
* Max L. Rowe Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
1 MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAw: STATE, LAW, AND
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WEsTERN EUROPE (1996).
2 MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
3 MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, LAW, AND FAMILy. FAMILY LAw IN TRANSITION IN
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1977).
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sought ajust division of marital property between spouses in our mod-
ern, redefined marriage.
To name just one of her many insightful contributions, her artic-
ulation of the concept of the "new property" pointed to the broad
shift in our day from tangible possessions to social entitlements, a shift
that had not been appropriately reflected in the division of "property"
at the end of marriage, a shift to which our law still seeks to adapt.
Despite her candidly expressed worries about the storms now rag-
ing around the family, Mary Ann remains optimistic about the family's
future:
However frail and faltering they may currently seem to be, families
remain, for most of us, the only theater in which we can realize our
full capacity for good or evil, joy or suffering. By attaching us to
beings and feelings that are perishable, families expose us to con-
flict, pain and loss. They give rise to tension between love and duty,
reason and passion, immediate and long-range objectives, egoism
and altruism. But relationships between husbands and wives, par-
ents and children, can also provide frameworks for resolving such
tensions.4
Far beyond family law, Mary Ann has concerned herself with
broader societal developments. In A Nation Under Lawyers5 she scath-
ingly-but with humor, irony, and erudite sophistication-indicts the
changed direction (away from legal training) of current standards and
methods of legal education, and deplores the resultant oversupply of
lawyers who do not enjoy being lawyers and who are ill-equipped to
play the part, at the social cost of decreased quality and ethics.
In her always thought provoking and sometimes provocative
work, Professor Glendon has not sought unanimous approval. In an
academic climate of overwhelming thought conformity, where devia-
tion from the approved fashion of "academic" thinking all too often
invites unfriendly attack, she stands out for not hewing to a "politically
correct" line. With sincerity and calm argumentation, Mary Ann has
sought to stem the tide of intellectual-and often radically gender-
oriented-chaos into which much academic writing on family law has
sunk, while at the same time not allowing herself to become a partisan
in the opposite extreme camp. Instead, she has unerringly worked for
good causes, as she sees them, and I cannot think of any critic who has
not lauded-or even has questioned-the quality of her scholarship.
4 Id. at 313.
5 MR ARANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAbvrERs: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 177-230 (1994).
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Beyond solitary scholarship and academic discourse, Mary Ann
has not hesitated to put her unique talent for diplomacy into world
and nation-wide causes. She had the distinction of being selected by
the Pope to be the Vatican's delegate at the 1996 Women's Rights
Conference in Beijing. She has been a leader in Professor Etzioni's
"Communitarian Movement." And, perhaps surprising to those who
do not know her, there was a time long ago when she was involved in
the activities of the National Lawyers Guild, a time when that organi-
zation stood for social progress.
Mary Ann sees the value of working with organized, broader so-
cial forces, instead of standing alone as an individual. I enormously
admire that willingness to get out in front of ideas and give personal
support and involvement to group-sponsored causes that strive for
good-when the armchair academic feels compelled to qualify any en-
dorsement of an agenda with reservations, footnotes, or dissents, even
at the cost of not being heard or not being influential. It credits her
courage to see that "group causes" are more potent forces for social
change than an individual can hope to be, and to accept the fact that
any group association furnishes a convenient target. Predictably, her
work for the Catholic Church, as well as for the Communitarian Move-
ment has come, in the view of some facile critics, at some cost.
But acting on her convictions is her nature-Mary Ann has been
a courageous advocate for positive change all her life. Early on, she
was in Mississippi working for racial equality and civil rights. Today
that sounds like pure credit, but it was not so at the time. At the most
personal level, her own family reflects the integrated diversity for
which this nation should strive, encompassing a child half-Black, an-
other half-Jewish, another Korean.6
In today's academy, being perceived as a "conservative" on target
issues may be as detrimental to a career as, in an earlier age of unrea-
son, it was to be named a "radical." While the president of Catholics
for a Free Choice called her "more conservative than the Pope,"7 Mary
Ann comments: "I always laugh when I hear myself described as a con-
servative," and views herself as "politically homeless," saying that she is
"more liberal than the right wing of the Republican Party and more
conservative than the liberal wing of the Democratic Party."
Significantly, however, her "homelessness" has not inhibited her
career. Some credit must be given to the often biased and conflicted
6 See Fox Butterfield, U.N. Women's Forum is a Test for Pope's Advocate, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 29, 1995, at A3.
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Harvard faculty9 for recognizing her as the "Learned Hand"-after a
splendid judge-chaired professor. Well beyond that, Glendon has
been sought out by the best law schools in this country and the world
as teacher, lecturer, and recipient of numerous honorary degrees.
This may be the greatest testimonial to her achievement in an age
where many law faculties seek to clone themselves in a uniform image.
In Mary Ann's words,
many legal academics still share with their colleagues in other disci-
plines the scholar's commitment to pursue knowledge wherever it
leads and whatever its unpopularity. But for a growing coterie of
professors in the human sciences, including law, that ideal is simply
meaningless. In some quarters, notions of knowledge, objectivity,
and truth have come under heavy attack. If truth is whatever you
want it to be, or the will of the stronger, the distinction between
scholarship and advocacy collapses. If the law is radically indetermi-
nate, then all legal scholarship becomes a form of advocacy. 10
It is a great honor to be asked to write a tribute to Mary Ann
Glendon, whose influence has reached so forcefully into and so far
beyond the United States. It also is a daunting, even a frustrating task.
Daunting, because what a challenge it is to attempt to review and re-
think her vast scholarship in so many areas of concern to the modern
world and, for that reason, to her. Frustrating, because what could I
say that would do her work and her person justice? I can do neither,
but I want to express my profound respect for-even as I stand in awe
of-this unique contributor to good and better in our world. She has
deeply influenced me and the best tribute I can offer Mary Ann, the
scholar, family advocate, internationalist, is a very sincere wish for her
continued work and influence.
I will add a few further remarks about a recent family law develop-
ment that has been of concern to me for some time."1 While my
"questions" may be inspired by Mary Ann's work, the "answers" raised
here are sufficiently out of "synch" with mainstream thinking that I do
not wish to implicate her further.
One divorce reform debate is over: marital status is no longer seri-
ously at issue. Divorce is available at the will of either the wife or the
husband-regardless of fault or merit, or who did what for, or to
9 For a recent example, see Derrick Bell, At Last, Harvard Sees the Light, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 1998, at A24.
10 GLENDON, supra note 5, at 209.
11 See, e.g., Harry D. Krause, Property and Alimony in No-Fault Divorce, 14th Congress
of Comparative Law, Acaddmie Internationale de Droit Compare Athens, July 31-Au-
gust, 1994.
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whom. Even where fault grounds remain on the books, "no-fault" ap-
proaches are available as an alternative.
For a long time, of course, the Western tradition allowed no di-
vorce at all-at least not with the right to remarry. Short of death,
annulment was the sole "remedy" and was available only if there was a
pre-existing impediment to marriage. Abuse flourished, in terms of
unrestrained inventiveness regarding impediments to marriage. Even
then, only a fraction of the perceived need was served, and the early
divorce reformers of the nineteenth century complained that disaf-
fected parties should be allowed a final divorce for fault, including the
right to remarry. They succeeded.
While marital status became dissoluble by divorce, the state con-
tinued to reserve for itself the power to grant or deny divorce, relying
on a historical (typically religious) definition of marital (moral) fault.
In effect, that law prescribed that only an "innocent" spouse could
divorce only a "guilty" spouse. Conversely, this meant that an "inno-
cent" spouse could not be divorced against her or his will. Guilt and
innocence were defined by the legal grounds for divorce. In short, if
one played by the rules, traditional marriage provided economic sta-
bility and social security.
The reformers of the mid-twentieth century finally acted on the
long-running complaint that the traditional catalogue of marital fault
grounds was too narrow and out of touch with the realities of modem
marriage. But they still focused on status and on fault. It seemingly
escaped their notice that de facto no-fault, like consensual divorce,
had been practiced for a long time, and for decades ever more bla-
tantly. Indeed, just before no-fault divorce reform finally swept the
secular world in the 1960s and 1970s, upward of 90 percent of all di-
vorces were "consensual." The negotiation over status hid the real is-
sue: economic consequences.
In practical reality then, and in contradiction to the law on the
books, status had not been the important issue in divorce for a consid-
erable time. The old law did not mean that divorce was difficult.
Rather, it meant that if one party wanted a divorce but had no "li-
censed" grounds, he or she had to negotiate and pay the other's price
for agreeing on a typically fictitious fault ground, thus allowing the
divorce to go forward. Divorce went at the price for which the "willing
seller" would sell the marriage. That price was equal to what the "will-
ing buyer" would pay for the divorce. Financial and other concessions
(e.g., on child custody) brought supply and demand into equilibrium,
and "economics" worked. The grounds that ostensibly governed the
issue of status thus underhandedly governed the financial conse-
quences of divorce. But where Judge Posner and the newer Chicago
1998] 1359
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Economics Nobelist, Gary Becker, might praise the free market,
others saw a sort of jungle law.
Where the professed aim of no-fault divorce reform had been to
bring humane sense to a corrupt process, the significant change it
actually brought was divorce at the will of either party. At the margin,
the move was from consensual divorce to unilateral divorce. What was
hailed as reform reduced the role of contractual fidelity, and depreci-
ated reasonable, economic reliance interests in the most confidential
legal relationship. Marriage has become the only contract out of
which a breaching party may walk with impunity and, likely as not,
profit. Perplexingly, this came to our civilization at the very time
when so many other areas of the law moved from caveat emptor to an
extraordinary, unprecedented concern for the economic underdog.
A great and thorough literature is led in point of time and insight by
Max Rheinstein 1 2 and his student, Mary Ann Glendon,' 3 the first and
last editor-in-chief, respectively, of the family law volume in the Inter-
national Encyclopedia of Comparative Law.
When the modem State stopped asking whether the dissonant
parties should be granted or denied their divorce, financial arrange-
ments openly took center stage. Today's contested questions include
the allocation of alimony, the distribution of property, and decisions
on child support, aside from child custody. But given the complexi-
ties of the task, the financial consequences of divorce-especially ali-
mony and property division-have not been resolved as fully or as
easily as was the status issue.
Nearly accomplished legal equality of women and men and re-
lated social change have accelerated emotion-charged attacks on the
alimony front 14-even while eligibility for alimony has been extended
to men. 15 In the United States and elsewhere, "liberated" men pro-
claim that they should not be forced to support what some judges
have called "alimony drones." They add that women should no
longer view marriage as "a bread ticket for life." Many feminists con-
sider alimony demeaning, as it spells continued financial dependence
on a possibly despised ex-spouse. Adding insult to injury, alimony
may subject the recipient to nasty conditions involving post-marital
sexual behavior. To illustrate, traditional alimony often ended on the
12 See MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE, STABILrrY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW (1972).
13 See MAX RHEINSTEIN & MARY ANN GLENDON, Interspousal Relations, in 4 INTERNA-
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: PERSONS AND FAMILY ch. 4, at 3 (1980).
14 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Kennedy, 303 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1974); Brantner v.
Brantner (In re Marriage of Brantner), 136 Cal. Rptr. 635, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
15 See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
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ex-wife's remarriage and today, in some places, when she "cohabits"-
whatever that may mean.16
To escape the acrimony of alimony and to achieve finality in the
divorce, the mid-century reformers' emphasis, as reflected in the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), turned to the division of
"property." Reform legislation, such as the influential UMDA, pro-
posed to bring an end to the divorced marriage as completely as possi-
ble. Alimony, therefore, was to be the rare exception, and instead the
new emphasis was on the division of property.
It may be worth noting here that, even in separate property re-
gimes, there had long been full equality between husband and wife in
matters of property: each owned until and kept after divorce all prop-
erty that he or she had earned and saved during the marriage. The
problem with that equality was that typically only one of them had
earnings: the husband. Commendably, the treatment of property on
divorce has now undergone fundamental change, favoring the eco-
nomically weaker spouse, typically the wife, by splitting "equitably" all
property acquired by either spouse during the marriage. So far, so
good.
All too often, however, the overarching goal of modem divorce,
finality, collides with the reality that there is no significant amount of
property in the majority of cases. And for better or for worse, the goal
of finality of divorce, if manifested in terms of decreased long-term
provisions for a spouse on divorce-where that dependency was cre-
ated by marriage and, particularly, by marital role division-does in-
crease the risk of marriage. The reform movement sought to
compromise between the need for provision and the goal of finality by
talking in terms of limited alimony, short-term, under the theme of
"rehabilitation." From what? Typically from motherhood-formerly
revered as fulfilling the most important social and personal needs.
Rehabilitation to what? To self-support, but all too often without ade-
quate concern for the dependent spouse's lack of appropriate and
adequate economic opportunity. Adding insult to injury, the very
word "rehabilitation" suggests pathology. It implies that the marital
role-division that makes full-time parenthood possible now is consid-
ered pathological.
This sounds harsh, but it may be the only reasonable adaptation
to our short-term-oriented society, where loyalty counts little and self-
16 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sappington, 478 N.E.2d 376, 378 (Ii1. 1985) (inter-
preting llinois' statute ch. 40, para. 510 (b) as it existed at the time). Cf CAL. Civ.
CODE § 4801.5 (repealed 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1986 & Supp.
1998).
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fulfillment increasingly is seen narrowly in terms of the literal self
rather than through the spectrum of the family. Moreover, the tradi-
tion of the mother as full-time parent, as an exclusive track for women
and as an all but inescapable consequence of gender, certainly was not a fair
societal response to the joint parental responsibility of child rearing.
(Indeed, neither was the role of sole financial provider that was-and
quite typically still is-thrust upon the man)
The United States Supreme Court has certified marriage and pro-
creation as fundamental human rights.' 7 One may fairly conclude,
however, that present legal, economic, and social circumstances have
rendered these rights less meaningful by making their exercise too
costly. The legal and economic incentive structure may already be so
loaded against the role-divided family that an intelligent woman or
man no longer has a reasonable choice to forego market participation
in favor of family role division.
Back to the financial consequences of divorce: Who should get how
much, of what, from whom, and why? The answer remains elusive and
the task undone, although many laws have been passed. Again, most
divorce reformers have asked us to believe that "marital fault" is irrele-
vant, both to alimony and to property division. While I do not want to
digress too far to belittle the seemingly obvious and important distinc-
tion between property and alimony, perceptive observers have long
known that that distinction in too many cases is arbitrary or non-exis-
tent. When a "property division" may tap an earner's future income
stream, and an alimony obligation can be satisfied by way of a lump
sum paid out of existing property, what, other than the label, is the
distinction? That the label can of course be quite important in terms
of evoking quite different legal consequences is still another matter,
but also not one that makes much sense, as I have elaborated
elsewhere.' 8
Back to fault: the perception that inquiry into marital fault is fu-
tile and unpleasant had properly dominated the divorce reform de-
bate, but then the question was what marital fault should govern the
status decision, and then the State presumed to reserve to itself the
decision whether parties should be allowed to divorce at all. Once it
had been resolved that fault should no longer answer the question
whether to allow divorce, the reformers carelessly transferred their
aversion to fault to the very different question of what the financial
consequences of the termination of marriage should be.
17 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
18 See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 460-64 (3d ed. 1995).
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However, are not the risks of marriage increased and is marriage
not diminished as a legal status, and as an economic good, if "good"
or "bad" behavior does not matter? Is it not intuitive-at least to the
general public-that "fault" and "merit" are relevant to achieving "fair-
ness"? Fault and merit are relevant in all other areas of the law, so why
are they not relevant to the fair distribution of the financial burdens
(and benefits) of divorce? Of course they are! The true question is
what is fair, and how should (or can) "merit" and "blame" be judged.
While the standard, preferred answer "we can't tell, we don't want to
know, and there's no such thing as a nice husband or a nice wife any-
way" is not satisfactory, it also is not easy to define and apply a worka-
ble standard of marital merit and blame. But this does not mean that
we should not try-nor indeed that it is not already happening.
This notion is not picked out of the air. In several U.S. states, an
extreme return to marital fault through an unexpected side door
threatens to create havoc with no-fault divorce. Tort law has become
the vehicle, alongside or after a divorce action, to compensate one
spouse financially for torts inflicted during the marriage by the other
spouse. This became possible only with the recent wholesale abolition
of traditional tort immunities prohibiting tort litigation between
spouses. And in law, what is possible usually becomes real.
Leaving to one side the legitimacy of litigating physical torts in-
flicted on one spouse by the other intentionally or negligently, my
focus of concern is on "emotional distress." Following is one of the
first such cases.
In 1988, a jury in Houston awarded a divorcing wife $1.4 million
for "severe emotional distress" caused by her husband's marital mis-
conduct. Not the lurid National Enquirer, but the staid Wall StreetJour-
nal reported that "on a visit to her husband's office in 1986, she found
him sprawled nude with a former company secretary."'19 While the
Texas appellate court reversed this award, similar cases are reaching
the appellate level elsewhere-with a considerable burden of expen-
sive litigation and risk of fundamental incursion into post-divorce fi-
nancial arrangements. 20 But litigated appellate cases may fairly be
assumed to be only the tip of the iceberg. How many such claims are
now settled without litigation, for fear of litigation?
19 Carolyn Phillips, Divorce Case Marks First Time a Spouse Wins a Civil Award for
Emotional Distress, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1988, at 39.
20 See, e.g., Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. 1991); Twyman v. Twyman,
855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
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It is reason for concern-and the dispute is not over defending
family lawyers' "turf' and their sources of income-when tort lawyers
argue:
Marital tort litigation took off and shows no signs of regressing. Na-
tionwide, marital tort recoveries are high .... When considering
the more common torts-such as intentional or negligent infliction
of emotional distress, assault, defamation, false imprisonment, and
interference with child custody-counsel must give careful thought
to asserting as an element of damages post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD).... State no-fault statutes often do not do enough to re-
dress wrongs. With no-fault, one spouse may abuse the other with-
out legal consequence-even though the conduct would be
deemed tortious if committed by a non-spouse.21
Even today, some of us are still convinced that it is the very es-
sence of marriage that it is not a relationship between strangers. But if
the idea of right and wrong is one whose time has never gone, its
return to the financial aftermath of marriage through tort law will re-
introduce to the end of marriage more and worse acrimony than no-
fault divorce ever eliminated.
Many arguments militate conclusively against the mechanical ap-
plication of the traditional marital fault grounds for divorce, from
adultery to desertion, to the financial consequences of divorce. But
the discussion need not stop there. Is it really so difficult or impossi-
ble or undesirable to factor a new, modernized notion of "fault" into
the decision of how to apportion the financial burdens or benefits of
divorce?
And, surprise, courts are already doing some of this work. In sep-
arate property states courts are creating a newjurisprudence concern-
ing the "dissipation" of marital assets, imposing what amounts to a
duty on the owner of separate (but, on a future divorce, marital) prop-
erty to deal with such property in good faith or even during the ongo-
ing marriage. This doctrine stems from the community property
states, 22 and today often is reinforced by statutory provisions in sepa-
rate property states. Quite obviously there is a close relationship of
the concept of dissipation to fault, though not old-line moral "marital
fault," but a pragmatic notion of "economic fault." It may be a little
puzzling to those who believe in gender equality that the positive mir-
ror image of economic dissipation, "economic merit" (although it is
mentioned in the UMDA as "contribution" in direct conjunction with
21 Roxanne Barton Colin, A Safer, Saner, Fairer Nation, TRIAL, Oct. 1992, at 7.
22 See Beltran v. Beltran, 227 Cal. Rptr. 924 (Cal. 1986); Marriage of Foster, 227
Cal. Rptr. 446 (Cal. 1986).
1364 [VOL. 73:5
ON MARITAL FAULT
"dissipation"), has not nearly had the same impact. Illogically, the
marital estate typically is defined and divided without or with little
regard to whose effort produced it. This issue was the gist of the re-
cent Wendt litigation in Connecticut and is finally coming to popular
consciousness. 23
Beyond economic misconduct, is there a way to deal responsibly
with those cases of misconduct during marriage that overstep the
proper bounds of even an "unhappy" marital relationship? Concepts
such as blame and merit, unjust enrichment or quantum meruit are
starting places. It may be noted that quite a few years ago Germany
abandoned a nearly pure no fault approach and reintroduced a modi-
fied and limited catalogue of economic and other blame-and-merit
considerations to govern the apportionment of financial conse-
quences on divorce, at least in terms of alimony obligations, as follows:
A claim for support must be denied, reduced or limited in duration,
if the imposition of the obligation... would be grossly inequitable
because . . . (2) The recipient is guilty of a crime or of a severe
intentional offense against the obligor or against a near relative of
the obligor; (3) The recipient has caused his or her own need inten-
tionally or recklessly; (4) The recipient has intentionally or reck-
lessly disregarded significant financial interests of the obligor; (5)
For a considerable period of time before the separation, the recipi-
ent has grossly violated his or her duty to contribute to the support
of the family; (6) The recipient is responsible for obviously serious,
clearly unilateral misconduct against the obligor... !24
Does this German statute signal a "reactionary" return to a past
that would best be forgotten? I do not think so. Can it be improved
upon? Probably. For instance, it may not be altogether fair that this
provision-as did most of the abolished marital fault law-paves only
a one-way street: fault is used only to allow the escape from, or reduc-
tion of, a financial obligation-given continuing economic reality,
typically the husband's. Arguably, some types of fault should also
weigh in by increasing the obligation, typically favoring the wife. That
of course is the answer tort law provides, and that aspect of it may not
be all wrong-nor is it unprecedented in the sense that old-time ali-
mony was sometimes imposed as a sort of punishment on the husband
23 SeeJudith H. Dobrzynski, Judge Splits on Issues and Money in G.E. Executive's Di-
vorce Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1997, at D1, D18. Note, however, that recognition of
.economic merit" is specifically rejected by the American Law Institute's reform pro-
ject. AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALY-
SIS AND REccOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft, Part I, February 14, 1997), at
10-11.
24 BURGERI.IcHES GESETZBUCH [Civil Code] (BGB) § 1579 (F.RG.).
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for his breach of his marital obligations. I want to re-emphasize, how-
ever, that I do not offer a solution here regarding how some modem
notion of merit or blame (broader than the current exclusive focus on
economic misconduct) should be reintroduced to the financial after-
math of divorce-I only raise the question. I am sure, however, that
relying on existing tort law to deal with marital misconduct is the
worst-case alternative. Whatever may be the appropriate answer, that
answer should be developed in the context of divorce law.
This is the setting in which we find ourselves today. The purpose
of this short essay is to take issue with the many prominent family law
reformers and law reform projects which think that any return
whatever of any fault considerations at all to the divorce process is
sacrilege, a sinful betrayal of the no-fault divorce reform idea. Regret-
tably-and worried perhaps by the "foot-in-the-door-argument"-
most of the discussion on this topic has not been willing to admit that
there is a distinction between considering some appropriately focused
notion of fault in the allocation of financial divorce consequences on
the one hand, and the status decision, the granting of the divorce, on
the other!
In particular, I am simply not persuaded by my friend Ira Ell-
man's otherwise brilliant and exhaustive argumentation in his Intro-
duction to Proposed Final Draft25 of the American Law Institute's (ALI)
current project on Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. There
the ALI rejects any role for any notion of "fault" with respect to the
financial consequences of divorce. In a related and more radical
move, alimony is restyled from the traditionally-and that tradition
includes the only recently revolutionary Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act-need-based discretionary tool into a right to "Compensa-
tory Spousal Payments" that would monetize economic "loss" from the
failed marriage in favor of the party who was inactive, less active, or
less successful in the marketplace. 26
25 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND REcOMMENDA-
TIONS (Proposed Final Draft, Part I, Feb. 14, 1997), at 14-15.
26 As discussed above, I certainly agree that we must reduce the economic risks of
marriage for the economically weaker party for whom modem, fault-free, unilateral
divorce has made the option of role-divided marriage increasingly unattractive. I also
have long argued that traditional fault-based alimony law yielded wholly inappropri-
ate results in numerous situations, and that objective criteria for alimony needed to
be developed to reflect the parties' "investments" in their marriage as well as to com-
pensate continuing services rendered to the former marriage (as in post-divorce child
custody). See Harry D. Krause, The Theory of Alimony, in CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAM-
ILY LAW 963-69 (1976); see also KRAUSE, supra note 17, at 421-26. I also believe, how-
ever, that we must not now overbalance the equation so far that marriage will come to
pose unacceptable economic risks for the economically stronger party-lest we shall
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More regrettably, the ALl project would abdicate family lawjuris-
diction over marital misconduct that takes the form of newly de-immu-
nized intra-family torts, and relegate such now "tortious" misconduct
to litigation outside of the context of divorce, rather than insist that
all issues arising out of a failed marriage be dealt with in one setting.
There certainly was good reason for lifting (or in any event modi-
fying) all (or in any event most) marital tort immunities. But who
intended or even contemplated creating a machine that would, in a
worst case scenario, make possible (1) signing over on divorce to the
non- or less earning home-husband not only one-half of the property
accumulated due to the wife's economic effort, but also (2) an equal-
izing portion of the wife's earning capacity for a period of time in the
form of a "compensatory spousal payment," and then still (3) poten-
tially allow the transfer to the husband of the wife's remaining prop-
erty (and earning capacity) as a damagejudgment based on what used
to be viewed as marital misconduct? Please, let's think about this
some more!
see long-term familial relations sink further into the legal and social anarchy of un-
married cohabitation. See id. at 74-87, and Harry D. Krause, Unmarried Couples, 34
Am. J. Comp. L. 533-48 (Supp. 1986).
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